Spurious Complexity and Common Standards in Markets for Consumer Goods by Gaudeul, Alexia
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Spurious Complexity and Common
Standards in Markets for Consumer
Goods
Alexia Gaudeul
Department of Economics, University of East Anglia, ESRC Centre
for Competition Policy
November 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19647/
MPRA Paper No. 19647, posted 30. December 2009 10:19 UTC
ISSN 1745-9648 
                                             
 
Spurious Complexity and Common 
Standards in Markets for Consumer 
Goods* 
by 
Alexia Gaudeul 
Dept. of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University 
of East Anglia 
 & 
Robert Sugden 
Dept. of Economics, University of East Anglia 
 
 
CCP Working Paper 07-20 
 
Abstract: Behavioural and industrial economists have argued that, because 
of cognitive limitations, consumers are liable to make sub-optimal choices in 
complex decision problems.  Firms can exploit these limitations by introducing 
spurious complexity into tariff structures, weakening price competition.  This 
paper models a countervailing force.  Consumers’ choice problems are 
simplified if competing firms follow common conventions about tariff structures.  
Because such a ‘common standard’ promotes price competition, a firm’s use 
of it signals that its products offer value for money.  If consumers recognize 
this effect, there can be a stable equilibrium in which firms use common 
standards and set competitive prices. 
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There is growing evidence that consumers can find it difficult to process 
complex decision problems.  As a result, they may fail to choose in 
accordance with what, after sufficient reflection, they would acknowledge to 
be their own best interests.  The recognition of this problem by behavioural 
economists is producing a literature which advocates paternalistic 
interventions to simplify consumers’ choice problems, by imposing what are 
claimed to be only mild restrictions on their freedom of choice (Sunstein and 
Thaler, 2003a, 2003b; Camerer et al, 2003).  A complementary literature in 
industrial organisation is investigating whether profit-maximising firms can 
exploit consumers’ cognitive limitations by introducing spurious complexity 
into tariff structures.  The typical finding is that firms have incentives to follow 
such strategies, and that their doing so tends to make markets less 
competitive, inducing welfare losses (Ellison and Ellison, 2004; Ellison, 2005b; 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006).  These findings appear to 
strengthen the case for regulation, by showing that, in the absence of 
regulation, consumers do not merely have to navigate the ‘natural’ complexity 
of competitive markets; they also have to cope with unnecessary complexity 
which has been deliberately created to confuse them. 
 
In this paper, we argue that these literatures neglect an important 
countervailing force which is intrinsic to competitive markets: the common 
standard effect.  The essential idea is that consumers’ choice problems are 
made less complex if competing firms follow common conventions about tariff 
structures, package sizes, labelling, and so on.  By facilitating comparisons 
between products, such conventions promote competition between the firms 
that follow them.  But, precisely because they promote competition, they also 
signal that goods that meet common standards are likely to offer good value 
for money.  Thus, consumers can learn by experience to favour products 
which meet common standards.  If consumers act in this way, profit-seeking 
firms are induced to adopt those standards and are penalised for deviating 
from them.  
 
The common standard effect can be distinguished from other market 
mechanisms which promote the simplification of consumers’ choice problems.  
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In particular, it should be distinguished from those mechanisms which work 
through the incentive for individual firms to build reputations as trading 
partners who provide value for money, rather than seeking to trap unwary 
consumers.  The common standard effect is a complementary but distinct 
mechanism, which works at the level of the market rather than the firm.  
Common standards are market-wide conventions.  Firms reveal themselves 
as offering value for money, not by signalling their individual identities as 
reliable trading partners, but by displaying features that are characteristic of 
reliable firms in general.   
 
In this paper, we present a model of a market in which, in the absence of 
common standards, consumers would find it difficult to make accurate 
comparisons between the tariffs of competing firms, allowing firms to set 
prices above the competitive level.  We investigate the conditions under 
which, despite this opportunity for the exploitation of consumers’ cognitive 
limitations, common standards can evolve and become self-sustaining.  
 
1.  The intuition: does Wal-Mart offer too much choice?  
As an introduction to the intuition behind our argument, consider the following 
passage from the paper in which Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003a) 
advocate ‘libertarian paternalism’: 
 
How much choice should people be given?  Libertarian paternalists 
want to promote freedom of choice, but they need not seek to provide 
bad options, and among the set of reasonable ones, they need not 
argue that more is necessarily better.  Indeed that argument is quite 
implausible in many contexts.  In the context of savings plans, would 
hundreds of thousands of options be helpful?  Millions? Thirty years 
ago, most academics had only two investment options in their 
retirement plan, TIAA and CREF.  Now most universities offer more 
than one provider and often dozens, if not hundreds, of funds from 
which to choose. …  Do participants gain from this increase in their 
choice set? ... [O]ne recent study finds that when [US pension] plans 
offer more choice, participants are slower to join, perhaps because 
they are overwhelmed by the number of choices and procrastinate.  
(pp. 1196-1197) 
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The suggestion is that, even when there is no spurious complexity, 
unregulated markets can present consumers with too much choice, and that 
there can be a case – indeed, a case that could be accepted by libertarians – 
for paternalistic interventions designed to reduce the range of choice. 
 
Sunstein and Thaler’s paper has sparked off a vigorous debate on the web.  
One participant quotes Newt Gingrich as having said: 
 
If you were to walk into a Wal-Mart and say to people, ‘Don’t you feel 
really depressed by having 258,000 options; shouldn’t it be their 
obligation to reduce the choice you must endure?’, they would think 
you were nuts.1 
 
Gingrich is surely right: most supermarket customers would be astonished at 
the suggestion that the range of choice presented to them was too large.  
Sunstein and Thaler implicitly recognise the implausibility of the ‘too much 
choice’ claim in relation to ordinary consumer purchases by restricting its 
application to situations in which consumers are poorly informed or lacking in 
experience; they allow that ‘better informed choosers can more easily 
navigate the menu options’ (pp. 1197-1198).  Thus, they might accommodate 
Gingrich’s objection by arguing that the typical consumer has well-informed 
preferences about the goods in Wal-Mart, while the typical employee lacks 
such preferences about pension plans.  But is this kind of appeal to informed 
preferences sufficient to account for consumers’ confidence in navigating 
supermarkets? 
 
Imagine a store which stocks the 258,000 Wal-Mart options, but in which 
these goods are arranged on the shelves in a random order, changed every 
24 hours.  Further, imagine that all products are packaged in plain white 
containers; on each package, the nature of its contents is described in black 
print in a standard typeface.  We conjecture that if consumers had no choice 
but to shop at such a store, they would find shopping an extremely onerous 
task, and would welcome a reduction in the number of options.  The point of 
this thought experiment is that our ability to navigate supermarkets is highly 
                                                 
1
 The quote is from a discussion piece entitled ‘Choice and its enemies’, dated 19 April 2005, by Pejman 
Yousefzadeh, at http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=041905D. 
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dependent on the existence of conventions about how options are displayed.  
One such set of conventions governs retailers’ decisions about which 
products are placed close to which.  For example, in just about all 
supermarkets, the different coffee products are placed close together, and 
relatively close to the different tea products.  A customer who is looking for tea 
knows she is in roughly the right part of the store when she sees coffees; 
when she locates the tea section, she can readily compare the different teas.  
Another set of conventions governs producers’ decisions about the packaging 
of their products.  For example, there are family resemblances among the 
package designs used by different tea producers.  Because of these features, 
the customer can quickly locate tea products against a background of other 
groceries.  It seems undeniable that there must be some mechanisms at work 
in retail markets, favouring the emergence and persistence of conventions 
that reduce the complexity of consumers’ choice problems.  This paper 
investigates one such mechanism. 
 
Of course, casual observation also reveals many cases in which producers 
and retailers contravene established conventions as a profit-seeking strategy.  
For example, supermarkets sometimes place their ‘special offers’ away from 
the shelves used to display similar but normally-priced goods.  It would be 
naïve to deny that in many such cases, retailers are seeking to exploit 
consumers’ cognitive limitations.  However, competition surely restricts the 
scope for this kind of obfuscation.  If consumers find it easier to get value for 
money when they shop in supermarkets which use standardised layouts, they 
will tend to patronise supermarkets that are laid out in standard ways; retailers 
who try to entrap customers by using unfamiliar layouts will lose business.  
Intuitively, it seems that we are observing a balance of forces, some of which 
favour the emergence of common standards while others favour deviation 
from those standards.  The existing literature on spurious complexity has 
concentrated on the latter.  Our paper is an attempt to redress the balance. 
 
2.  The model 
We present a model which shows the common standard effect at work in a 
very simple environment.  For clarity in exposition, we adapt Jeffrey Perloff 
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and Steven Salop’s (1985) well-known model of a market with product 
differentiation.  We focus on a market for a single consumer good, sold 
directly by producers to consumers.  We consider the possibility that sellers 
might try to exploit the cognitive limitations of buyers by introducing spurious 
complexity into their pricing structures. 
 
Although this case is chosen mainly for ease of modelling, it has practical 
interest in its own right.  There are many examples, particularly in the 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water industries, of markets in which 
firms compete to supply exactly the same product to consumers.  In Britain, 
for example, domestic consumers can choose between competing electricity 
and gas suppliers, but the consumer has access to the same power and 
pipeline grids, irrespective of which supplier she chooses.  In this 
environment, competition can only be in terms of prices.  Suppliers typically 
offer a wide choice of tariffs, apparently catering to different patterns of 
electricity and gas use.  There is evidence that consumers often fail to choose 
the lowest-cost supplier, which raises the possibility that tariff complexity is 
reducing competition (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2006). 
 
The case we model has more general theoretical interest.  Robert Sugden 
(2004a) has investigated how far competitive markets can deliver normatively 
desirable outcomes when consumers lack well-defined and consistent 
preferences.  He presents a model in which, for the market to be efficient in 
generating opportunities for consumers, it is sufficient that there is free entry 
for profit-seeking arbitrageurs, and that consumers are ‘price-sensitive’.  At 
any given moment, a price-sensitive consumer buys goods only at the lowest 
prices currently quoted for them (and sells only at the highest); in all other 
respects, she may be highly irrational (for example, by buying a good at a high 
price and then immediately selling it at a lower price).  Clearly, this result is 
blunted if, in reality, the task of finding the most favourable price is cognitively 
demanding.  Sugden’s model implicitly assumes that all prices are quoted in a 
standard form, so that price comparisons can be made easily.  The present 
paper investigates whether such a standard might be self-enforcing. 
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Our model is of a one-period market for a good which is supplied by n 
competing firms, where n ≥ 3.2  Formally, we investigate equilibrium properties 
of this market.  In interpreting the model, however, we imagine a sequence of 
periods in which the market is repeated, during which firms and consumers 
learn to follow optimal strategies.  Implicitly, we assume that consumers 
cannot recognise the continuing identities of individual firms through time; this 
screens out of the model any effects of reputation-building.  Our equilibrium is 
to be interpreted as the end-point of a learning process.  
 
There are N consumers, identical to one another ex ante.  (The model 
includes some stochastic variables whose realisations may differ between 
consumers.)  We assume that N/n is sufficiently large to legitimate the use of 
the law of large numbers when analysing the effects on firms of random 
variation at the level of the consumer.  Each consumer buys a fixed quantity of 
the good, the same for all consumers; her problem is simply to satisfy this 
given demand at the lowest cost.  As a normalisation, we define this quantity 
to be one consumption unit of the good.  However, we do not assume that the 
consumer is consciously aware of this concept of quantity.  As an example of 
the kind of situation to which our model might apply, consider a consumer who 
contracts with an electricity supplier to buy power according to a particular 
tariff over a fixed period, and then uses electricity as she needs it, without 
taking any account of the specificities of that tariff.  At the end of the period, 
she is billed for whatever she has consumed (which, in fact, will be one 
‘consumption unit’).  The tariff might, for example, comprise a fixed charge, a 
charge per daytime kilowatt hour (kWh) and a charge per night-time kWh.  In 
our terminology, a consumption unit is the consumer’s total consumption over 
the billing period, distributed between day and night according to the 
consumer’s pattern of electricity use (which, by assumption, is independent of 
the tariff).  The consumer might have only a very hazy idea of how her 
consumption converts into kilowatt hours at different times of day, while being 
keenly aware, ex post, of the bottom line of the bill. 
                                                 
2
 Many of our results would not hold for a market with only two firms.  In our model, the demand conditions for a firm 
which shares a ‘standard’ with at least one other firm are different from those for a firm whose standard is unique to 
itself.  Our analysis of ‘CS equilibrium’,  in which all firms use the same standard, relies on the property that if one 
firm deviated from that standard, the other firms would still share a standard.  
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In this environment, there is scope for spurious complexity in tariff structures.  
Since purchases are the same for all consumers and are independent of the 
tariff under which they are bought, the relevant information in any tariff can be 
expressed as a single price, defined as the amount charged for one 
consumption unit.  However, there are many different ways of presenting this 
information.  As in our previous example, the unit might be subdivided into 
separately-priced components by using multi-part tariffs, or by charging 
different rates for consumption at different times of day.  If two firms present 
their price information in sufficiently different forms, it may be difficult for 
consumers to work out which is offering the lower overall price.  We represent 
this idea by modelling a tariff as a combination of a price and a standard.  The 
price is an objective property of the tariff, about which the consumer is not 
directly informed.  The standard is the device by which this information is 
presented.  Any given standard is capable of expressing any given price.  We 
will assume that each consumer’s ‘reading’ of any tariff is subject to random 
error; thus, each tariff provides only a noisy signal of its true price.  However, 
if two tariffs use the same standard, the consumer can make an accurate 
ordinal comparison of the corresponding prices.  As an illustration of the 
underlying idea, suppose that electricity tariff A has a fixed charge of £10 per 
month, a day rate of £0.14 per kWh, and a night rate of £0.06 per kWh.  Tariff 
B has the same fixed charge, the same definitions of ‘day’ and ‘night’, and the 
same night rate, but a day rate of £0.12 per kWh.  It is easy for a consumer to 
see that tariff B is cheaper, even if she does not know how much it will cost 
her to buy electricity on each tariff, or how much less she will pay on tariff B 
than on tariff A.  In the language of our model, the two tariffs are using a 
‘common standard’ (one in which differences in price are expressed through 
differences in the day rate). 
 
The assumption that every consumer buys one consumption unit, irrespective 
of the tariff, allows the concept of ‘spurious’ complexity to be given a simple 
definition.  In most real-world cases, different consumers, even when fully 
informed, may have different preferences over tariffs.  In the case of multi-part 
electricity tariffs, for example, consumers whose demand is relatively low will 
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prefer tariffs with low fixed charges and high rates per unit, while those with 
high demand will prefer the opposite.  Thus, when consumers are 
differentiated, complexity in tariff structure can play a role in tailoring firms’ 
offers to the tastes of individual consumers and in facilitating price 
discrimination.  Even so, it remains true that complexity can make it harder for 
consumers to compare the offers of competing firms.  The implication is that, 
from the viewpoint of consumers, there can be too much complexity and 
differentiation in tariff structures.  Our modelling strategy allows us to isolate 
the component that is ‘too much’.  
 
In our model, each firm i has the same differentiable total cost function C(qi) 
where qi is the firm’s output, measured in consumption units.  C(.) has a 
minimum efficient scale (MES) q*, such that q* ≤ N/n (so that, if consumer 
spending is distributed evenly between firms, all firms produce at or above 
MES).  For qi ≥ q*, C(qi) = cqi, where c represents both average and marginal 
cost.  For qi ≤ q*, average cost is decreasing in quantity and marginal cost is 
non-decreasing; there are non-zero fixed costs, so that average cost tends to 
infinity as quantity tends to zero.3 
 
Each firm seeks to maximise expected profit.  Each firm i sets a tariff (pi, si) 
where pi is its price per consumption unit and si is its standard; pi is chosen 
from the set of strictly positive real numbers, and si from an infinite set S of 
possible standards.  If the tariffs of two firms i, j have the property that si = sj = 
s*, we will say that these firms use s* as a common standard.  Notice that 
there can be more than one common standard in the market.  A standard that 
is used by only one firm is individuated. 
 
                                                 
3
 We differ from Perloff and Salop, and from many other models of markets with fixed numbers of firms, by assuming 
a MES cost function rather than one with constant marginal cost at all levels of output.  The latter type of cost function 
has the unrealistic property that a firm which sells a positive quantity at any price greater than marginal cost can 
make positive profit, no matter how small its sales.  We will be analysing cases in which some firms are in Bertrand 
competition, pricing at marginal cost, while other firms have the option of setting higher prices while still having 
positive sales.  We want to leave open the question of whether (or under what circumstances) this option is profitable.  
Cost functions of the MES type are generated if there are constant returns to scale in production but the firm has 
fixed costs in the form of a commitment to buy a minimum vector of inputs.  As a simple example, let q be output and 
let lk be the quantity of input k used in production (k = 1, .., m).  Assume a Leontief production function q = mink(lk/ak), 
where (a1, ..., am) is a vector of positive coefficients.  For each input k there is a unit price wk and a minimum quantity 
l′k which the firm is committed to buying.  Thus, expenditure on each input k is wkmax(l′k, lk).  This gives a piecewise 
linear MES total cost function. 
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Each consumer’s problem is to choose one (and only one) of these tariffs.  
For a representative consumer h, the ex post utility of choosing the tariff of 
firm i is α + βvhi – pi, where α + βvhi is the subjective value of a consumption 
unit supplied by firm i, normalised to monetary units.  The parameter α > 0 
represents the average value of a consumption unit, ranging across all 
consumers and all firms; we implicitly assume that this value is sufficiently 
high that consumers always want to buy rather than not.  We use βvhi to 
represent idiosyncratic value – that is, a component of subjective value that is 
specific to the match between a particular consumer and a particular firm.  
The term vhi is an iid random variable with zero mean, bounded support and a 
continuous and differentiable single-peaked density function.  The parameter 
β > 0 allows us to formalise the idea that idiosyncratic value is a very small 
component of subjective value; where appropriate, we do this by taking limits 
as β→0.4 
 
If the ex post utility of each tariff was known to consumers ex ante, we would 
have a model very similar to that of Perloff and Salop.  Crucially, however, we 
assume limitations on consumers’ abilities to infer ex post utility from tariff 
information.  We model these limitations as follows. 
 
Consider any consumer h assessing the tariff of any firm i.  We assume that 
the consumer receives a signal rhi, where 
(1) rhi = α + βvhi – pi + ehi.   
Here ehi is an error term, representing the cognitive difficulty of inferring the 
price per consumption unit from the information provided by the tariff.  We 
assume that ehi is an iid random variable with zero mean, bounded support 
and a continuous and differentiable single-peaked density function.5 
 
                                                 
4
 For modelling purposes, it convenient to assume a small component of idiosyncratic value.  As will emerge later, 
this assumption ensures that the demand elasticity for common-standard firms is finite.  It also ensures that it is 
optimal for consumers to use signals when comparing tariffs with different standards, even in equilibria in which all 
tariffs have the same price.      
5
 By assuming that the distribution of ehi is the same for all tariffs, we abstract from the possibility that some standards 
are more difficult to understand than others.  Our hunch is that people’s intuitive sense of ‘simplicity’ in tariffs, product 
specifications, labelling, and so on is often a matter of convention: it is easier to process information if it comes in 
familiar forms.  Whatever the truth of this, our concern in this paper is with the emergence of common standards, not 
of ‘intrinsic’ simplicity. 
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If every firm uses a different standard, the n signals constitute the whole 
information available to the consumer.  Clearly, her optimal strategy is then to 
choose the tariff with the highest signal.  (Because of the continuity 
assumptions we have made about idiosyncratic value and error, ties occur 
with zero probability and so can be ignored.)  If, however, some firms use 
common standards, the consumer receives additional information.  For any 
firms i, j, if si = sj, then the consumer is informed of the true ranking of the 
corresponding ex post utilities – that is, she knows the sign of [βvhi – pi] – [βvhj 
– pj].6  Thus, if all firms use the same standard, the optimal strategy is to 
choose the tariff with the highest true ranking, independent of the signals.  
Since some significant properties of our model can be shown by using only 
these two obvious optimality principles, we postpone the question of how the 
consumer should choose when at least some firms use common standards, 
but it is not the case that all firms use the same standard. 
 
3.  Two equilibria  
Our concept of equilibrium is Bertrand–Nash.  That is, we assume a strategic 
interaction in which firms move first, simultaneously choosing tariffs; next, 
each consumer chooses a tariff, determining the sales of each firm; firms 
produce to meet these demands and incur the corresponding costs; and 
finally, consumers are billed for the quantities they have bought.7  A state of 
the model can be described by specifying the tariff (pi, si) of each firm i = 1, ..., 
n.  For this state to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that no firm can 
increase its profit by changing its tariff, given the tariffs of other firms, and 
given the decision rules used by consumers.  It must also be the case that, 
given the tariffs set by the firms, each consumer’s decision rule maximises her 
expected utility. 
 
                                                 
6
 This specification implies that, within a given standard, the consumer can integrate differences of idiosyncratic value 
into her ranking of tariffs.  In terms of our illustrative story of electricity tariffs, it might be thought more realistic to 
assume that the within-standard information is the sign of pi – pj, and that this has to be evaluated in combination with 
the numerical value of β(vhi – vhj), i.e. the difference in idiosyncratic value.  Given that idiosyncratic value plays only a 
minor role in our model, we prefer to use the simpler specification of the main text. 
7
 The assumption of an MES cost function implies that there are no capacity constraints and that the profit of firm i is 
strictly increasing in qi at any given price pi > c, and non-decreasing at pi = c.  In the equilibria we consider, pi ≥ c for 
every firm i.  Thus, no firm would want to produce less than the quantity it can sell at its posted price.    
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Thus, the following is a necessary condition for equilibrium: for any firm i, 
holding constant its standard si, its price pi must maximise its profit with 
respect to its (Bertrand–Nash) conjectural demand function – that is, the 
function that plots how the quantity qi sold by firm i varies with pi and si when 
all other firms’ tariffs remain unchanged.  It is an elementary result in the 
theory of the firm that the marginal condition for profit-maximisation with 
respect to price is: 
(2) [pi – C′(qi)]/pi  =  – (qi/pi)/(∂qi/∂pi). 
The LHS of (2) is the price-cost margin; the RHS is the reciprocal of the price 
elasticity of conjectural demand (expressed as a positive number). This result 
will be used repeatedly in our analysis. 
 
We now characterise two equilibria.  The first is equilibrium with individuated 
standards or, for short, IS equilibrium.  In IS equilibrium, each firm i chooses 
its standard si at random.  Since S is an infinite set, the probability that any 
two firms choose the same standard is zero. All firms set the same price, pI.  
Each consumer h chooses to buy from the firm with the highest signal rhi.  
Adapting a proof presented by Perloff and Salop, there is exactly one value of 
pI that is consistent with Bertrand–Nash equilibrium; this price is greater than 
c, which implies that firms make positive profits.8 
 
Here is an intuitive sketch of the proof.  First notice that, given that all firms 
use different standards, consumers optimise by choosing between tariffs 
according to their signals.  Given that consumers choose in this way, firms’ 
sales and hence their profits are independent of the standards they use.  So, 
in proving the existence of IS equilibrium and in investigating its comparative-
static properties, we need make no further reference to standards.  Suppose 
that all firms except one (say, firm j) set the price pI.  Let η(pI) be the price 
elasticity of conjectural demand for firm j, expressed as a positive number and 
evaluated at pj = pI.  Notice that when all firms set the same price, the quantity 
sold by each firm is N/n which, by assumption, is more than MES; so, for each 
                                                 
8
 Perloff and Salop assume that each consumer h chooses the firm i such that θhi – pi is maximised, where pi is the 
price charged by firm i and θhi is a random variable representing the ‘value’ of firm i’s product to consumer h.  The 
latter variable plays the same role as α + βvhi + ehi in our model. 
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firm, marginal cost is c.  Thus, adapting (2), pI is an equilibrium price if and 
only if 
(3) (pI – c)/c =  1/η(pI).    
Now consider the determinants of η(pI).  It follows from the specification of rhi 
in (1) that, if all firms except one (say, firm j) charge pI, the probability that j’s 
signal is the highest for any given consumer depends only (and negatively) on 
pj – pI.  Thus, the gradient of j’s conjectural demand curve at pj = pI is 
independent of pI.  Since j’s sales at pj = pI are independent of pI (they are 
equal to N/n), the corresponding elasticity η(pI) is strictly positive and 
increasing in pI.  Equivalently, the RHS of (3) is strictly positive and 
decreasing in pI.  Clearly, the LHS of (3) is increasing in pI, taking the value 
zero when pI = c and tending to infinity as pI tends to infinity.  Thus (3) can be 
satisfied by one and only one value of pI. 
 
IS equilibrium can be interpreted as a state of affairs in which firms take 
advantage of consumers’ cognitive limitations.  Spurious complexity in tariffs 
prevents consumers from making accurate price comparisons.  Because price 
signals are noisy, a firm can raise its price above the level charged by other 
firms while continuing to find buyers.  This allows the market to support prices 
in excess of marginal cost, even in the absence of ‘genuine’ product 
differentiation (that is, even when β→0). 
 
The second equilibrium is equilibrium with a common standard, or CS 
equilibrium.  Consider the decision rule followed by any given consumer in 
choosing between tariffs.  We will say that a decision rule rejects individuated 
standards if it chooses a tariff with a common standard whenever at least one 
such tariff is available.  A decision rule respects ordinal information if, 
whenever there is information about the true ranking of the ex post utilities of 
two tariffs (that is, whenever those tariffs have a common standard), it never 
chooses a tariff which is known to be inferior.  In CS equilibrium, all 
consumers follow decision rules which respect ordinal information; for a 
sufficiently high proportion of consumers, their decision rules also reject 
individuated standards.  All firms use the common standard s* and set the 
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same price pC.  Given that all firms behave in this way, the decision rules used 
by consumers are weakly optimal for them.  (It is both necessary and 
sufficient for optimality that decision rules respect ordinal information.)  
Adapting the same proof as before from Perloff and Salop, there is exactly 
one value of pC that is consistent with Bertrand–Nash equilibrium, given that 
all firms use a common standard.  As β→0, the equilibrium value of pC tends 
to c and profits tend to zero.  Given that a sufficiently high proportion of 
consumers use rules which reject individuated standards, no firm can benefit 
by deviating unilaterally from the common standard.  (If all consumers use 
rules of this kind, any firm which deviates from the common standard sells 
nothing and so makes negative profit.) 
 
CS equilibrium can be interpreted as a state of affairs in which firms do not 
take advantage of consumers’ cognitive limitations.  Because firms use a 
single common standard, each consumer is able to make accurate ordinal 
comparisons between the ex post utility of buying from different firms.  As the 
degree of product differentiation (represented by β) tends to zero, the 
relationship between firms converges to Bertrand competition, and price tends 
to marginal cost.  
 
A comparison between IS and CS equilibrium suggests that the strategy of 
rejecting non-shared standards is self-validating at the market level.  
Intuitively, that strategy can be rationalised in terms of a belief that shared 
standards are a signal of low prices.  If all consumers follow this strategy, an 
equilibrium can be sustained in which firms use a market-wide common 
standard; and the existence of such a common standard induces low prices.  
This gives some reason to expect that CS equilibrium is stable.  We will firm 
up that intuition by investigating the dynamics of our model. 
 
4.  Dynamics 
For the purposes of our dynamic analysis, we treat the model as described in 
Section 2 as a game that is played repeatedly by the n firms and N 
consumers.  Over time, firms revise their tariffs (by adjusting prices, 
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standards, or both) in the direction of increased profitability, while consumers 
revise their decision rules in the direction of increased expected utility. 
 
The analysis in this section will be somewhat speculative.  It is extremely 
difficult to prove even static equilibrium results, even for the apparently simple 
Perloff–Salop model in which marginal costs are constant and the issue of 
common standards is not considered.  For example, it seems natural to 
expect that, in the Perloff–Salop model, an increase in the number of firms 
would induce a fall in the equilibrium price; but this cannot be proved in 
general.  And it is not known whether that model has equilibria in which 
different firms charge different prices (Perloff and Salop, 1985).  We are 
investigating the dynamic properties of a considerably more complicated 
model. 
 
Our dynamic analysis is based on the following simplifying assumptions: 
 Minimal idiosyncratic differentiation.  As in the analysis of IS and CS 
equilibria, we consider only the limiting case of the model as β→0. 
 Naïve and savvy consumers.  Since the purpose of the dynamic 
analysis is to investigate the evolution of strategies towards optimality, we 
cannot assume that, in every period, consumers’ decision rules are optimal 
with respect to the frequency distribution of tariffs in that period.  But the range 
of logically coherent decision rules that are applicable to the consumer’s 
problem is far too wide for all such rules to be included in a tractable dynamic 
model.  We must therefore work with a restricted set of decision rules. 
 
Recall that a consumer h has two types of information at her disposal.  For 
each firm i, she has a noisy signal rhi of the ex post utility of choosing that firm.  
In addition, for each pair of firms i, j with a common standard, she is correctly 
informed of the ordinal ranking of the corresponding ex post utilities.  For the 
purposes of our dynamic analysis, we consider just two decision rules. 
 
The first of these, which will be called naïve, implicitly assumes that the fact 
that two firms use a common standard is not in itself informative (either 
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positively or negatively) about the prices those firms charge.  A consumer who 
follows the naïve rule begins by comparing the n signals; she provisionally 
selects the firm, say i, with the highest signal.  She then considers the set of 
firms which use the same standard as i.  If this set is a singleton, she chooses 
firm i; otherwise, she chooses the firm in this set that has the highest ordinal 
ranking.  Notice that if all consumers follow this rule and if all firms in the 
market set the same price p*, each firm’s expected sales are N/n, irrespective 
of the standards they use.  This property can be interpreted as neutrality 
between firms using individuated standards and firms using common 
standards.9  The naïve rule is consistent with the consumer behaviour that 
characterises IS equilibrium.  
 
The second decision rule, which we call savvy, has a positive bias towards 
common standards: it implicitly assumes that common standards are 
indicative of low prices, and that this price advantage outweighs any 
differences in idiosyncratic value.  A consumer who follows this rule begins by 
asking whether any firms have common standards.  If there are any such 
firms, all firms with individuated standards are eliminated; she then applies the 
naïve decision rule to the remaining firms.10  Notice that if every firm in the 
sample has its own standard, she chooses the firm with the highest signal.  
This rule is consistent both with the consumer behaviour that characterises IS 
equilibrium and with that characterising CS equilibrium.11 
 
We do not claim that a bias towards shared standards is intrinsically ‘rational’; 
our interest is in whether such a bias might evolve in repeated interactions 
                                                 
9
 Contrast the rule which first uses the ordinal information to eliminate tariffs that are clearly inferior to others in the 
sample, and then chooses the tariff which, in the set of non-eliminated tariffs, has the highest signal.  If all consumers 
use this rule and if all firms set the same price p*, firms with individuated standards have higher expected sales than 
firms with shared standards. 
10
 A variant of the savvy rule favours standards that are shared by more firms to those that are shared by fewer.  
Thus, in a sample of six firms of which three share standard s′ and two share s″, the variant rule chooses the firm 
which, of those using s′, has the highest ordinal ranking.  Had we used this variant in our analysis, our main 
conclusions would have been unaffected.  The most significant effect of using the variant rule is to eliminate equilibria 
in which there are two or more common standards.  
11
 It might seem natural to add a third decision rule to the model – the rule that is the mirror-image of ‘savvy’, 
favouring individuated standards over shared ones.  But having three rules rather than two makes the dynamic 
analysis much more complicated, while having little effect on the main properties of the model.  To see why this is so, 
notice that the mirror-image rule is the best of the three for consumers, only in a case in which the price set by firms 
with individuated standards is lower than the price set by firms with common standards.  We will show that, in the 
only conditions under which this can be the case, common-standard firms are more profitable than individuated-
standard firms.  Thus, the profit-seeking tendencies of firms work to eliminate the conditions under which the mirror-
image rule would be beneficial to consumers.  
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when individuals learn by experience.  However, it is interesting to note that a 
heuristic with some similarities to the savvy rule has been observed by 
psychologists in situations in which it is apparently irrational.  The heuristic of 
asymmetric dominance applies to decision problems in which three options x, 
y and z are located in two dimensions of value; y dominates z while x neither 
dominates nor is dominated by either y or z.  It seems that individuals treat  
the dominance relation between y and z as a positive indicator of the value of 
y relative to x (Shafir and Tversky, 1993).  Analogously, if there are three 
tariffs i, j and k, and if j is known to be better than k, the savvy rule treats this 
as a positive indicator of the value of j relative to i.  This analogy suggests that 
the savvy rule may have some psychological plausibility, independently of any 
optimality properties. 
 
The proportion of savvy consumers is denoted by z.  This proportion may 
differ between periods, but in any given period it is treated as parametric.  (To 
avoid clutter, we do not use any notation to identify specific periods.) 
  
Fixed-standard and randomised-standard sectors.  We assume that, in any 
given period, the set of firms can be partitioned into two sectors (either of 
which may be empty).  Firms in the randomised-standard (RS) sector set their 
standards at random (as all firms do in IS equilibrium).  All firms in the fixed-
standard (FS) sector use a fixed common standard s* (as all firms do in CS 
equilibrium).  The number of FS firms is nF; this may differ between periods.  
For each period, we take the values of nF and z as given, and define a 
temporary equilibrium as an n-tuple of firms’ prices, such that no firm can 
increase its profit by changing its price, given its own standard, the prices and 
standards of other firms, and the decision rules used by consumers.  Our 
dynamic analysis focuses on the evolution of nF and z over time. 
 
How restrictive are these assumptions about standards?  First notice that, 
given the general structure of the model, there is no reason for a firm to use 
an individuated but non-randomised standard.  Given that a firm is using an 
individuated standard, its demand is unaffected by whether that standard was 
chosen deterministically or selected at random.  However, a firm (say j) which 
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intends to set an individuated standard puts itself at a strategic disadvantage if 
it fails to randomise, since if another firm k uses the same standard but sets a 
marginally lower price, k captures the whole of j’s intended sales (in addition 
to the sales k would have made by randomisation). 
 
The assumption that there is only one common standard is a convenient 
simplification, but is not essential for our main results.  Since we are analysing 
the limiting case as β→0, any two or more firms which use a common 
standard are effectively in Bertrand competition with one another (whatever 
the mix of naïve and savvy consumers); in temporary equilibrium, the price set 
by these firms must be infinitesimally close to marginal cost.  If there were two 
common standards, each used by two or more firms, the prices associated 
with those standards would be infinitesimally close to one another in 
temporary equilibrium.12  Thus, all that really matters for the analysis is the 
total number of firms which use common standards (that is, standards that are 
common to two or more firms); whether there is one or more such standard is 
immaterial. 
 
Our definition of temporary equilibrium implicitly assumes that changes in the 
distribution of firms between RS and FS sectors take place more slowly than 
changes in prices.  That assumption might be justified on the grounds that it is 
usually easier for firms to adjust their prices than to adjust their standards.  
The latter claim may seem more realistic for some real-world markets than for 
others; and it might be argued that developments in information technology 
are allowing firms to change their standards much more quickly and at much 
less cost than in the past.  For example, information technology has 
presumably reduced the administrative cost to a firm of changing the structure 
of multi-part tariffs; reorganising the layout of a website is surely less costly 
that reorganising that of a supermarket.  However, a transition between the 
RS and FS sectors involves more than a change in the firm’s interface with 
consumers.  It also involves a step change in the level of production and 
                                                 
12
 Suppose that, in temporary equilibrium, firms using some common standard s′ set a marginal-cost price p′, while 
firms using another common standard s″ set a marginal-cost price p″.  The supposition p′ ≠ p″ implies a contradiction, 
since the firms with the lower price must have both lower sales (because their marginal cost is lower, and marginal 
cost is non-decreasing) and higher sales (because of the decision rules used by consumers). 
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sales: typically, FS firms sell more than RS firms.  It seems reasonable to 
assume that changes of this kind take place over a longer time scale than 
incremental changes in prices within either sector. 
 
Symmetric temporary equilibrium.  We assume that, for each (z, nF) pair, there 
is a unique temporary equilibrium in which all RS firms set the same price, 
which we denote pR.  (There may also be non-symmetric temporary equilibria, 
but our analysis is concerned only with symmetric equilibria.)  
  
Having set out our simplifying assumptions, we proceed to the dynamic 
analysis itself. 
 
The nature of the dynamics is very different depending on whether nF is 
greater than 2.  To see why, consider the case nF = 2.  In this case, each FS 
firm has the unilateral power to eliminate the common standard by 
randomising its own standard.  In effect, each FS firm has the power to shift 
the market to IS equilibrium.  Since profits are strictly positive in IS 
equilibrium, while firms in Bertrand competition make zero profit, we should 
expect this power to be used.  For the reasons we presented in defending the 
assumption of ‘fixed-standard and randomised-standard sectors’, no firm 
would want to be the single FS firm in the case nF = 1: if one of two FS firms 
switches to randomised standards, the other will follow.  Thus, if the value of 
nF falls below 3, there will be a collapse to IS equilibrium.  In contrast, if nF ≥ 3, 
each firm has to take the existence of the common standard as given; it can 
choose only whether or not to use that standard. 
  
We now consider the dynamics of the model with nF ≥ 3.  The details of the 
analysis are explained in the Appendix.  Here, we restrict ourselves to the 
main results and the intuitions behind them.  Consider any (z, nF) such that n 
> nF ≥ 3 and 1 > z > 0.  Taking these values as given, we can define a 
symmetric temporary equilibrium.  Let pF, qF and piF be respectively the price, 
quantity sold and profit of each FS firm, and let pR, qR and piR be the 
corresponding values for each RS firm.  We assume that if piF > piR, there is a 
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tendency for firms to move from the RS sector to the FS sector and hence for 
nF to increase, and conversely if piF < piR.  If pF < pR, the expected payoff for 
consumers is greater if they use the savvy rule rather than the naïve rule; so 
we assume that in this case there is a tendency for z to increase.  Conversely, 
if pF > pR, there is a tendency for z to fall. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 (see pages 35 and 36) are phase diagrams showing two 
possible configurations of the dynamics.  As we show in the Appendix, pF ≥ pR
 
 
implies piF > piR.  Thus, the boundary conditions piF = piR and pF = pR divide (z, 
nF) space into at most three regions: region A in which piF < piR and pF < pR, 
region B in which piF > piR and pF < pR, and region C in which piF > piR and pF > 
pR. 
 
In every temporary equilibrium, RS firms set price above marginal cost.  
Irrespective of the values of pF and pR, these firms sell only to naïve 
consumers.  FS firms are in Bertrand competition and price at marginal cost.  
At low values of z, the high proportion of naïve consumers allows RS firms to 
charge more than the competitive price c and sell sufficiently large quantities 
to make positive profit.  FS firms produce above MES; pricing at marginal 
cost, they set pF = c and make zero profit.  This is region A. 
 
At higher values of z, the profit-maximising price for RS firms remains greater 
than the competitive price but, because there are relatively few naïve 
consumers, profits for RS firms are negative.  Again, FS firms produce above 
MES, set pF = c and make zero profit.  This is region B. 
 
At the highest values of z, it is possible that the demand faced by RS firms is 
so low that pR, despite being above marginal cost, is less than the competitive 
price.  (Recall that marginal cost may be increasing below MES.)  As in region 
B, profits for RS firms are negative.  But if RS firms are producing below the 
MES level, FS firms must be producing above it; so yet again, FS firms set pF 
= c and make zero profit.  This is region C.  Whether there is such a region 
depends on the value of C′(0), i.e. marginal cost at zero output, and on the 
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price elasticity of conjectural demand for RS firms.  Figure 1 shows the case 
in which there is a region C, while Figure 2 shows the case in which there is 
not.  
 
The arrows at the top edges of the two diagrams indicate a special property of 
the dynamics at nF = n.  At nF = n, all firms use common standards, and so the 
distinctive feature of the savvy rule, namely its rejection of individuated 
standards, has no bite.  Thus, the naïve and savvy decision rules give the 
same expected payoff, and there is no tendency for change in the value of z.  
 
Let E be the set of (z, nF) points at which nF = n, and with the property that 
any firm which unilaterally deviated to the RS sector would earn negative 
profit (while FS firms earn zero profit).  Notice that E is non-empty in both 
diagrams: it is the set of points at which nF = n and z > z′.  At each point in E, 
the following is true: all firms use a common standard and charge the 
competitive price; all consumers (savvy and naïve) follow decision rules which 
respect ordinal information; and the proportion of consumers whose (savvy) 
decision rules reject individuated standards is sufficiently large that no firm 
can increase profit by deviating from the common standard.  Thus, each of 
these points is a CS equilibrium.  Starting from any such point, if there are 
small perturbations of z or nF, the dynamics will restore the system to some 
point in E.  In this sense, CS equilibrium is locally stable.  Further, the basin of 
attraction of the set E includes all (z, nF) such that nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently 
close to 1.  Of course, we have not yet proved that CS equilibrium has these 
properties; we have merely illustrated these properties in two conjectured 
configurations of the dynamics.  The proofs are given in the Appendix.  In the 
Appendix, we also explain the conjectures that lie behind certain features of 
the diagrams (such as the existence of region A, and the downward-sloping 
boundary between regions A and B) that are not essential for our main 
argument. 
 
Finally, we note one further feature of the dynamics.  Suppose an additional 
constraint is imposed on the model, such that at least two specific firms are 
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constrained to use the fixed standard s*, irrespective of the profits earned in 
the two sectors.   Thus, the value of nF cannot fall below 2, and when nF = 2, 
neither of the FS firms has the power to eliminate the common standard.  It is 
easy to see from the dynamic configurations of Figures 1 and 2 that, if this 
constraint is imposed, all feasible (z, nF) points are in the basin of attraction of 
the set of CS equilibria.  
 
5.  Interpretation 
In respect of our formal model, the most significant conclusion is that both IS 
and CS equilibria exist and are locally stable.  This raises the question of how 
a transition from one type of equilibrium to the other might occur.  More 
specifically, are there reasons to expect common standards to emerge 
spontaneously?  Failing that, what kinds of policy interventions might facilitate 
the evolution of CS equilibrium? 
 
If we remain within the confines of the model, we can answer these questions 
only in terms of basins of attraction.  In order for the dynamics of the model to 
lead to CS equilibrium, it is first necessary to be at a point at which at least 
three firms are using a common standard, and at which the proportion of 
savvy consumers is sufficiently high to ensure that, given the existence of the 
common-standard firms, individuated-standard firms are unable to avoid 
making losses.  If we want to ask whether such conditions are likely to occur 
in reality, we must step outside the model.  Are there real-world mechanisms 
which could induce these conditions, so that evolution towards CS equilibrium 
could then take hold? 
 
On the consumer side, we are looking for mechanisms which tend to sustain 
high values of z – that is, to sustain the strategy of favouring firms which use 
common standards – even in markets in which, and at times at which, 
common standards are rarely observed.  The stronger the background 
propensity of consumers to favour common standards, the more likely it is that 
a transitory episode in which such standards are used will initiate a self-
reinforcing process of movement to CS equilibrium.  One mechanism that 
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might have this effect works through the generality of the rule of ‘favouring 
common standards’.  The core idea is to favour tariffs or products which, by 
virtue of meeting common standards, facilitate value-for-money comparisons 
with their rivals.  This rule is not tied to any specific standard, to any specific 
firm or firms, or to any specific type of product.  Since, in any given market, 
either IS or CS equilibrium can be sustained, we might expect consumers’ 
experience of markets in general to include instances both of common 
standards and of individuated ones, and to provide evidence of the 
association between common standards and low prices.  Thus, the rule might 
be learned in one context and then applied in others.13  
 
As far as firms are concerned, we need to ask the following question:  starting 
from a situation in which firms’ standards are individuated, are there dynamic 
or stochastic processes that might induce episodes in which a small number 
of firms temporarily use common standards?  In thinking about this issue, we 
should recognise that the concept of completely randomised standards, as 
used in the definition of IS equilibrium, is a modelling simplification.  The 
nearest realistic equivalent to randomisation is a situation in which each firm 
changes its standard frequently and unpredictably and, when doing so, avoids 
standards that are currently used by other firms. 
 
If changing standards is costly, or if there is some constraint on the frequency 
with which changes are made, the choice of standards becomes a game of 
strategy between firms.  A crucial component of such a game is the fact that, if 
two or more firms are pricing above the competitive level and if one firm (say i) 
can predict the price and standard that another firm (j) will set in a given 
period, then i can gain sales at j’s expense by replicating j’s standard while 
undercutting its price (see Section 4).  It is this possibility of being undercut 
that forces firms to keep changing standards, and the constant change in 
standards is essential for the sustainability of non-competitive prices.  But, if 
firms are to continue to respond to the possibility of being undercut, the 
probability of being undercut must be non-zero.  Thus, individuated standards 
                                                 
13
 Compare Sugden’s (2004b, pp. 49-54) discussion of how conventions can spread from one context to another by 
analogy: rules which have more general application and are more susceptible to analogy are better equipped to 
reproduce themselves.  See also Marks (2002). 
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and non-competitive prices can persist only in combination with episodes of 
undercutting.  In other words: in a realistic form of IS equilibrium, individuated 
standards will be the norm, but there will be occasional episodes of price 
competition between firms which are temporarily using common standards.  
To the extent that price competition, when it does occur, is associated with 
common standards, consumers are rewarded for using the rule of favouring 
such standards.  This provides an additional reason for expecting that, in a 
realistic form of IS equilibrium, consumers might learn to favour common 
standards. 
 
The tendency for episodic price competition will be greater if, contrary to 
another of the simplifying assumptions of our formal model, different 
standards are not completely symmetrical with one another.  If consumers 
have preferences between standards, or if some standards are more costly for 
firms than others, an IS equilibrium will be a state of affairs in which some 
firms make more profit than others, by virtue of using ‘better’ (that is, more 
preferred or less costly) standards.  We should expect some form of strategic 
competition between firms seeking to position themselves at the better 
standards.  This seems likely to produce occasional periods of price 
competition at those standards. 
 
The implication of all this, we suggest, is that a realistic form of IS equilibrium 
will be a state of turbulence, in which firms are constantly changing standards 
for tactical purposes, sometimes with the intention of finding a standard that is 
unique to themselves, but sometimes with the contrary intention of replicating 
other firms’ standards and competing on price.  At least some consumers will 
learn to associate common standards with relatively low prices.  The more 
consumers favour common standards, the greater the incentive for firms to 
undercut one another.  (The firm that undercuts not only takes sales from the 
firm that is undercut, but also attracts savvy consumers.)   A state of 
turbulence with these general characteristics seems capable of inducing, if 
only infrequently, the preconditions for evolution to CS equilibrium. 
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Of course, we must also consider the possibility of transitions from CS to IS 
equilibrium.  As Figures 1 and 2 (pages 35 and 36) show, the main threat to 
an existing CS equilibrium is a fall in the proportion of savvy consumers.  If all 
firms use a common standard, naïve consumers incur no penalty, and so the 
proportion of savvy consumers can drift downwards.  Depending on the 
precise configuration of the dynamics, such drift might take us into the basin 
of attraction of IS equilibrium.14  Thus, the long-run stability of CS equilibrium 
requires some mechanism that continues to reward the use of the savvy rule.  
In abstract theoretical terms, random perturbations in the value of nF would 
supply such a mechanism, inducing a long-run tendency for movement to (z″, 
n) in Figure 1 or to (1, n) in Figure 2.  In more realistic terms, what is required 
is some non-zero probability that, at any time, the market contains maverick 
firms which set non-standard tariffs whose prices are systematically above the 
competitive level.  Again relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions of the 
formal model, this could be explained in terms of heterogeneity in the 
population of consumers.  Suppose, for example, that a small proportion of 
consumers have intrinsic preferences for particular standards.  Such a 
standard, if not also the common standard of the CS equilibrium, might 
provide a niche for a high-price, individuated-standard firm. 
 
Our tentative conclusion is that there may be general market mechanisms 
which, in the long run, favour the evolution of common standards.  We present 
this conclusion as a contribution to the understanding of markets, and not as 
an argument against regulation.  To the contrary, our analysis can be read as 
a rationale for some degree of light-touch regulation to impose common 
standards on tariff structures – for example, requiring staple food products to 
be labelled with prices expressed in terms of a stipulated unit of quantity, or 
requiring all offers of loans to express interest rates in a standard ‘annual 
percentage rate’ form.  Such regulation is ‘light-touch’ in the sense that it 
supports a transition from one Nash equilibrium (with high prices) to another 
(with low prices); once the transition is complete, the regulation is effectively 
self-enforcing.  Further, it may not be necessary to impose the regulation on 
                                                 
14
 Notice that not all points in region A are necessarily in the basin of attraction of IS equilibrium.  Starting from points 
in A but close to the boundary with B, it is possible that the dynamics lead into region B, and then to CS equilibrium. 
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all firms; all that is needed is that the number of firms that are required to use 
a common standard is enough to initiate a self-reinforcing process of 
transition.  Under the assumptions of our model, the regulation of two firms is 
enough (see the final paragraph of Section 4). 
  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the self-regulating powers of the 
market system.  We should be cautious about inferring, from the growing 
evidence of the cognitive limitations of economic agents, that when markets 
offer ‘hundreds of thousands of options’, that is too many.  We need to take 
account of how conventions might evolve to help boundedly rational 
consumers navigate the complexity of the market.  Perhaps economics can 
learn something from Gingrich’s Wal-Mart customer.  
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Appendix:  Derivation of the dynamic properties of the model 
Proof of claims made in Section 4 
Let E be the set of (z, nF) points such that nF = n and any firm that unilaterally 
deviated to the RS sector would earn negative profit.  We now show that this 
set of CS equilibria is non-empty, and that its basin of attraction includes all (z, 
nF) such that nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently close to 1.  Our proof considers the 
temporary equilibrium associated with any given (z, nF) where n > nF ≥ 3 and 1 
> z > 0.  We use pF, qF, piF, pR, qR and piR to denote the temporary equilibrium 
values of price, quantity and profit for FS and RS firms.   
 
Step 1.  We show that pF ≥ pR implies piF > piR.  Since FS firms are in Bertrand 
competition, the price-cost margin for such firms is zero, i.e. pF = C′(qF).  RS 
firms sell only to naïve consumers.  Because naïve consumers use noisy 
signals to differentiate between tariffs, each RS firm faces a downward-
sloping conjectural demand curve.  Thus, price-cost margins for RS firms are 
positive, i.e. pR > C′(qR).  Now suppose pF ≥ pR.   By virtue of the properties of 
the price-cost margins, this implies C′(qF) > C′(qR).  Since marginal cost is 
non-decreasing, and since N/n ≥ q*, this is possible only if qF > q* > qR.  The 
inequality qF > q* implies pF = C′(qF) = c and piF = 0.  Since average cost is 
decreasing at quantities less than q*, qR < q* implies C(qR)/qR > c.  But pR ≤ pF 
= c.  Thus, RS firms are selling at a price below average cost, and so piR < piF. 
 
Step 2.  The result from Step 1 establishes that, as claimed in the main text, 
the boundary conditions piF = piR and pF = pR divide (z, nF) space into at most 
three regions: region A in which piF < piR and pF < pR, region B in which piF > piR 
and pF < pR, and region C in which piF > piR and pF > pR. 
 
Step 3.  Given the continuity properties of the model, the result from Step 1 
also establishes that regions A and C, if they exist, must be separated by 
region B.  (If A and C shared a common boundary, points on that boundary 
would have piF = piR and pF = pR.) 
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Step 4.  If pF < pR, it follows from the specification of the consumers’ decision 
rules that qF > qR, irrespective of the value of z.  Thus, since N/n ≥ q*, we 
have qF > q*.  Since FS firms price at marginal cost, this implies pF = c and piF 
= 0.  It has been shown as part of Step 1 that, if pF ≥ pR, then pF = c and piF = 
0.  Thus pF = c and piF = 0 everywhere.  
 
Step 5.  We now show that region C cannot include values of z arbitrarily 
close to 0.  Suppose, to the contrary, that there is a temporary equilibrium with 
pF > pR and z ≈ 0.  Since pF > pR, each RS firm must sell to more naïve 
consumers than each FS firm does; since almost all consumers are naïve, we 
have qF < qR.  But from Step 1, pF > pR implies qF > qR, a contradiction. 
 
Step 6.  Notice that, for all nF such that 3 ≤ nF < n, qR → 0 as z → 1.  (This 
follows immediately from the fact that RS firms sell only to naïve consumers.)  
Since fixed costs are strictly positive, piR < 0 as z → 1, while piF = 0.  Thus, 
points at which z ≈ 1 are either in region B or in region C (or on the boundary 
between these regions). 
 
Step 7.  We now show that, starting from any (z, nF) point at which pF = pR, 
increases or decreases in nF (with z constant) do not affect the temporary 
equilibrium values of pR – pF or piR – piF.  Consider any RS firm j.  It sells to, 
and only to, those naïve consumers for whom its signal is the highest.  The 
expected number of such consumers depends only on the total number of 
naïve consumers and the price charged by each firm.  Thus, if pF = pR, the 
conjectural demand function faced by any RS firm j is independent of the 
distribution of other firms between the RS and FS sectors.  So changes in nF 
do not affect the temporary equilibrium values of pR and piR.  But, from Step 4, 
pF = c and piF = 0 everywhere.  So changes in nF do not affect pR – pF or piR – 
piF.  This implies that if region C exists, the boundary between it and region B 
(i.e. the locus of points at which pR = pF) is a vertical line in (z, nF) space.  
(Conceivably, there could be a ‘thick’ boundary zone with vertical edges.  For 
simplicity, we do not consider this case, but our proof can be extended to take 
account of it.) 
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Step 8.  Suppose region C exists.  Then, from Steps 3, 5, 6 and 7, there is 
some z″ such that 0 < z″ < 1, all points to the right of the line z = z″ are in 
Region C, and points immediately to the left of the line are in Region B.  Then 
there exists a set E of CS equilibria which contains (at least) all points (z, nF) 
such that nF = n and z ≥ z″; and the basin of attraction for E includes the 
whole of region C, and a fortiori all (z, nF) such that nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently 
close to 1 (see Figure 1). 
 
Step 9.  Suppose region C does not exist.  Then, from Step 6, there is a 
region B which includes all (z, nF) such that nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently close to 
1.  For some z′ < 1, the set E of points at which nF = n and z > z′ is a set of CS 
equilibria, and the basin of attraction for E contains the whole of region B (see 
Figure 2).      
 
Steps 8 and 9 together establish that, for some z′ < 1, the set E of points at 
which nF = n and z > z′ is a set of CS equilibria, and that basin of attraction for 
E includes all points such that nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently close to 1.   
 
Further properties of the dynamics 
As we have drawn them, Figures 1 and 2 (pages 35 and 36) have the 
following three common properties in addition to those derived above: region 
A exists; it includes all (z, nF) such that n > nF ≥ 3 and z is sufficiently close to 
0; and the boundary between regions A and B is downward-sloping.  These 
properties are not essential to our analysis.  We conjecture that they hold for 
most plausible specifications of the functions in the model, but we cannot 
provide complete proofs that they do.  We now explain these conjectures. 
 
First, consider the effects on the relative profitability of FS and RS firms of an 
increase in z with nF constant.  We know from Step 4 of the proof that this 
increase in z will have no effect on pF (which will remain equal to c) or on piF 
(which will remain equal to zero).  Since RS firms sell only to naïve 
consumers, it seems reasonable to expect that a reduction in the proportion of 
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such consumers, associated with no change in the number of RS firms or the 
price charged by FS firms, will reduce the value of piR, and hence that of piR – 
piF. 
 
Next, consider the effects on the relative profitability of FS and RS firms of an 
increase in nF with z constant, starting from a point at which pF < pR (i.e. from 
a point in region A or region B, or on the boundary between these regions).  
We know from Step 4 that this increase in nF will have no effect on pF (which 
will remain equal to c) or on piF (which will remain equal to zero).  For any firm 
j which remain RS, qj depends only on the total number of naïve consumers 
and the price charged by each firm; the distribution of other firms between the 
RS and FS sectors influences qj only through its effect on the distribution of 
prices (compare Step 7).  The effect on j of an increase in nF is to increase the 
number of its competitors charging the relatively low price pF.  Intuitively, it 
seems reasonable to expect that this effect, associated with no change in the 
number of naïve consumers, will reduce the value of piR, and hence that of piR 
– piF. 
 
Suppose the conjectures of the two previous paragraphs are true.  Then, if 
region A exists, the boundary between it and region B is a downward-sloping 
curve, with A to the left.  Similarly, if region C exits, the boundary between it 
and region B is a vertical line, with C to the right.  We know from Step 5 that C 
does not include values of z that are arbitrarily close to zero.  So at values of z 
sufficiently close to zero, we cannot be either in or on the boundary of region 
C, i.e. we must have pF < pR.  By Step 4, pF = c and piF = 0 everywhere.  Let pij′ 
be the profit that would be earned by any RS firm j if it unilaterally deviated 
from temporary equilibrium by setting pj = c while still randomising its 
standard.  Since pR is the price which maximises j’s profit, given the tariffs of 
other firms, we know that pij′ ≤ piR, and it seems reasonable to expect this 
inequality to be strict.  But j’s sales to naïve consumers depend only on its 
own price and on the prices charged by other firms; they are independent of 
whether its standard is randomised.  Thus as z → 0, pij′ → piF.  This motivates 
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the conjecture that piF < piR at sufficiently low values of z.  In other words, 
points at which z ≈ 0 are in region A.    
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Figure 1: One configuration of the dynamics 
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Figure 2:  An alternative configuration 
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